xerox
421af63f20
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4 years ago | |
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badeye | 4 years ago | |
battleye.8.17.2020 | 4 years ago | |
README.md | 4 years ago |
README.md
i am writing this atm so come back later
badeye
lsass.exe/csrss.exe
This section will go into detail about what exactly is going on here. csrss.exe/lsass.exe have handles to all processes and since battleye strips the R/W access of the handle that these processes have
to the game it can cause system instability. Thus bedaisy writes two pages of shellcode to both processes and inline hooks NtReadVirtualMemory
and NtWriteVirtualMemory
.
If you run a battleye protected game, open cheat engine, attach to lsass.exe
, and navigate to NtReadVirtualMemory
/NtWriteVirtualMemory
you will see this inline hook...
This inline hook jumps to shellcode that packages all of the parameter values passed to NtReadVirtualMemory
into the stack and then jumps to DeviceIoControl
...
Now that you have a basic understanding of how this system works (and sorta why it is), lets look at what we can do!
To begin we need to extract the driver handle at runtime, this can be done simply by extracting the address of the shellcode out of the inline hook of NtReadVirtualMemory
. Nnow that we have
the handle to the driver we can start sending IOCTL's to BattlEye. The IOCTL data is not encrypted nor complicated... this is what it looks like:
limitations
Now that we can ask BEDaisy to read/write for us, what are the limitations? Well first off you cannot use this to read/write the process that battleye is protecting but you can use
this to read/write any other process you can open a simple handle too. Rust
, Valorant
, you name it, just open a PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION
handle and pass it to BEDaisy
. The reason
this works is two fold, firstly BattlEye assumes that the handle already has this access, secondly BattlEye only uses the handle to get the EPROCESS
so they can call MmCopyVirtualMemory
. You can see
this in my runtime logs of BEDaisy
.
01301313 118.65435028 [GoodEye]MmCopyVirtualMemory called from: 0xFFFFF804DEFE2D64
01301314 118.65435028 [GoodEye] - SourceProcess: csrss.exe
01301315 118.65435028 [GoodEye] - SourceAddress: 0x0000005A7B5DEF38
01301316 118.65435028 [GoodEye] - TargetProcess: DiscordHookHel
01301317 118.65435028 [GoodEye] - TargetAddress: 0x00000074452CE308
01301318 118.65435028 [GoodEye] - BufferSize: 0x0000000000000008