Both projects can be detected by enumorating page tables for changes in kernel PML4E page frame numbers. All process-context kernel mappings point to the same PDPTs unless
explicitly changed (by PSKP which both projects use). You can also explicitly detect the intel varient of this project by enumorating all processes for extra kernel PML4E's
The AMD varient of this project is already detected by EAC as its allocated in a kernel pool with no protections. Simple scans for `sub rsp, 28h`, `add rsp ?, ret` will
detect the mapped driver. You can also scan for `E8 ? ? ? ?` for calls that land inside of the same pool or land inside of a loaded kernel module.
Both versions of this project are highly unstable due to the face that they both use an out dated version of PSKP, PTM (not created yet), and VDM (not created yet).
This repo should serve as a reference rather then working code, after all it is luna-1, a probe to test how these theoretical concepts would play out.
This is an old project that tested many of my theoretical page table manipulation concepts. This project was created in part to find bugs/problems with my theories
and to be used as a reference for future projects. It was not ment to be used for anything else. From this project I have learned that PSKP (Process-Context Specific Kernel Patches)
is not page guard friendly. Patch guard does indeed check the kernel PML4E's to ensure they are pointing at valid PDPT's. Although triggering patchguard has never been
done before personally. This leads me to my second patchguard related conclusion; using this to patch ntoskrnl.exe does not bypass patchguard as patch guard can run in
all address spaces. Reguardless I have never been able to trip patchguard on these detections, I've ran this is code in a VM for over 48 hours doing a simple patch to
Another note about PSKP is that when memory is allocated in the new PDPT, PD, and PT it is not being mapped into other processes kernel mappings. This means its possible
to crash the system by allocating memory, KeStackAttaching and then accessing that memory (since its not mapped into the process you KeStackAttached too). Any function
that uses KeStackAttachProcess can cause an access violation and thus a crash. MmCopyVirtualMemory allocates a pool and then calls KeStackAttachProcess. This was the
reason i manually walk the paging tables and map the physical memory into virtual memory.
Since this project uses a very very old version of PTM, before PTM was every made, it uses a different technique to map physical memory into virtual memory.
The code in this project changes a PTE of a VirtualAlloc'ed page to point at another VirtualAlloc'ed pages PT. This allows the library to change the second
VirtualAlloc'ed pages PFN from usermode. If the original PFN is not restored before the program closes (and all virtual memory is unmapped), a crash will happen (PFN Corruption).
Also dealing with the TLB was a pain in the ass, the TLB was such an issue I created a new technique to get around it which is used in PTM. I generate new
virtual addresses on the fly now and ensure they are accessable.