Update README.md

merge-requests/1/head
_xeroxz 3 years ago
parent f4513155a8
commit 9cf8c84744

@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Thus a hook is placed on this SHA1 hash function and spoofed results are compute
### Solution, Possible Alternatives ### Solution, Possible Alternatives
* 1.) If EasyAntiCheat were to patch their own driver using `MmMapIoSpaceEx` - `PAGE_READWRITE` (for HVCI support), they could compute a SHA1 hash, then revert the changes, compute a second SHA1 hash... If the hashes are the same, then you know someone is hooking SHA1, or hooking `READQ/DW/B` virtual instructions... ***When i say patch i mean, change some padding/alignment bytes at the end of an unwriteable section***... * 1.) If EasyAntiCheat were to patch their own driver using `MmMapIoSpaceEx` - `PAGE_READWRITE` (for HVCI support), they could compute a SHA1 hash, then revert the changes, compute a second SHA1 hash... If the hashes are the same, then you know someone is hooking SHA1, or hooking `READQ/DW/B` virtual instructions... In other words, instead of checking for patches, check to see if your patches result in a different hash... ***When i say patch i mean, change some padding/alignment bytes at the end of an unwriteable section***...
* 2.) Map the driver into the usermode service as READONLY, this way the usermode service can just read the mapping and compute a hash... This has its own attack vectors considering it would require calling out to ntoskrnl/external code, however the idea is what matters, having multiple sources of integrity checking is ideal. * 2.) Map the driver into the usermode service as READONLY, this way the usermode service can just read the mapping and compute a hash... This has its own attack vectors considering it would require calling out to ntoskrnl/external code, however the idea is what matters, having multiple sources of integrity checking is ideal.

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